Non-technical summary
This paper analyzes the links between finance and growth in 30 Chinese provinces, over the period [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . China represents an interesting case study since it is often cited as a counterexample to the findings of the finance-growth literature: in spite of a malfunctioning financial system, it is in fact one of the fastest growing economies. Existing research on the links between finance and growth in China has led to contrasting results: some authors documented a positive relationship; others, a negative one; and others, no relationship at all. Our analysis extends the literature in several dimensions. First, we use a wide range of financial indicators, including traditionally used indicators of financial development (ratio of bank loans, total loans, or total household saving deposits in the banking system over GDP); China-specific indicators measuring the level of state interventionism in finance (credit provided by the four main stateowned banks over total credit or GDP; ratio of loans to deposits of the state-owned banks); and indicators measuring the degree of market driven financing in the economy (share of fixed assets investment financed by domestic loans relative to that financed by state budget appropriation; share of total investment financed by retained earnings). Our wide selection of indicators allows us to account both for the size and quality effect of financial intermediation. Second, for the first time in the Chinese context, we analyze the links between finance and two sources of GDP growth, namely physical capital accumulation and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Third, we investigate whether, as a result of the progressive restructuring of the banking sector in China, the link between finance and growth has changed after 2000. Finally, considering that China is among the top Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) recipients in the world, we investigate whether the finance-growth nexus changes for regions with different ratios of FDI stock to GDP.
We find that traditionally used indicators of financial development and China-specific indicators measuring the level of state interventionism in finance are generally negatively associated with growth and its sources, while indicators measuring the degree of market driven financing in the economy tend to promote GDP and TFP growth, as well as capital accumulation. This suggests that financial distortions do represent an impediment to growth.
In order to explain how, in spite of the distortions, China managed to sustain phenomenal growth rates, we show that the adverse effects of financial distortions on growth have gradually declined over time, probably due to the progressive restructuring of the banking sector in China. We also show that these effects tend to be weaker for high FDI recipients, suggesting that FDI may be used to alleviate the costs associated with the inefficient banking sector: private firms, which are generally discriminated against by the local financial system, might be able to use foreign joint-ventures as sources of finance, and might consequently achieve higher productivity and growth rates. FDI could therefore provide an explanation for why China is a counter-example to the findings of the financegrowth literature, being characterized by malfunctioning financial institutions and phenomenal growth rates. Introduction Studying the linkages between financial development and growth is a popular topic both in theoretical and empirical macroeconomics. According to Levine (2005) , financial systems foster growth as they produce ex ante information about possible investment; monitor investment and exert corporate governance after providing finance; facilitate the trading, diversification, and management of risk; mobilize and pool savings; and ease the exchange of goods and services. As early as 1969, Goldsmith (1969) provided the first cross-country empirical study documenting the existence of a link between finance and growth. A number of studies followed, generally confirming the existence of a strong positive link between the functioning of the financial system and growth (see Levine, 2005 , for a survey).
This paper analyzes the links between finance and growth in 30 Chinese provinces, over the period [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] 1 . China represents an interesting case study: Allen et al. (2005) characterize it as a counterexample to the findings of the finance-growth literature, as in spite of a malfunctioning financial system, it has one of the fastest growing economies 2 . The
Chinese case suggests therefore that there might be circumstances under which financial distortions do not represent an impediment to growth.
Existing research on the links between finance and growth in China has led to contrasting results: some authors documented a positive relationship; others, a negative one;
and others, no relationship at all. Our analysis extends the literature in several dimensions.
First, we use a wide range of financial indicators, including traditionally used indicators of financial intermediary development (ratio of bank loans, total loans, or total household saving deposits in the banking system over GDP); China-specific indicators measuring the level of state interventionism in finance (credit provided by the four main state-owned commercial banks over total credit or GDP; ratio of loans to deposits of the state-owned banks); and indicators measuring the degree of market driven financing in the economy (share of fixed assets investment financed by domestic loans relative to that financed by state budget appropriation; share of investment financed by retained earnings). Our wide selection of indicators allows us to account both for the size and quality effect of financial intermediation.
Second, for the first time in the Chinese context, we analyze the links between finance and two sources of GDP growth, namely physical capital accumulation and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Third, we investigate whether, as a result of the progressive restructuring of the banking sector in China, the link between finance and growth has changed after 2000. Finally, considering that China is among the top Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) recipients in the world (Prasad and Wei, 2005) , we investigate whether the finance-growth nexus changes for regions with different FDI stock to GDP ratios. This exercise is motivated by Harrison et al. (2004) , who show that firms in countries with greater FDI inflows are less likely to face financial constraints, as incoming foreign investment provides an additional source of capital. It is therefore possible that, in the Chinese case, FDI provides capital to firms which would otherwise be constrained in their growth by the inability to obtain funds, due to distortions in the banking sector 3 .
We find that traditionally used indicators of financial development and China-specific indicators measuring the level of state interventionism in finance are generally negatively associated with growth and its sources, while indicators measuring the degree of market driven financing in the economy tend to promote GDP and TFP growth, as well as capital accumulation. These effects have gradually declined over time and tend to be weaker for high FDI recipients, suggesting that FDI may be used to alleviate the costs associated with the inefficient banking sector.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the Chinese financial system and review the literature on the finance-growth nexus in China.
Section 3 describes our data set and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates our baseline specification and presents our main empirical results. Section 5 investigates how the relationship between growth and our financial indicators has evolved over time, and how it is contingent on the level of FDI received by each province. Section 6 concludes.
Financial system and finance-growth nexus in China

China's financial system
Before 1978, the Chinese economy was centrally planned and production was exclusively conducted by state-owned enterprises. The financial system consisted of a single bank, the People's Bank of China (PBC), which served both as a Central Bank and as a commercial
bank. Yet, the role of the PBC was very limited as most long-term investment financing was not channelled to enterprises through the banking system, but financed with budgetary grants.
The PBC only provided working capital to enterprises. percent of the total assets of the entire financial sector. Moreover, the banking system was plagued by huge amounts of non performing loans (Podpiera, 2006) .
Major banking reforms were initiated in 1994 when the central government decided to separate policy banks from commercial banks, and established three policy-lending banks and four specialized commercial banks. The banking reforms thereafter include, among others:
transforming the urban credit cooperatives into commercial banks (1996) (1997) (1998) ; granting limited licenses to some foreign banks; reducing government intervention in credit allocation; loosening interest rate controls; recommending standard accounting and prudential norms (Shirai, 2002) . A further impulse for changes in the banking sector came about with China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Progresses include fewer restrictions on ownership and increased operational freedom. As a consequence of the reforms, by the end of 2002, the state-owned banks' market share had declined to 68 percent, and non performing loans had also significantly declined (Podpiera, 2006; Allen et al., 2006) .
Despite the large size of the banking sector in China, until recently, most bank credit was directed to inefficient state enterprises, leaving good private enterprises without access to external funding. Until 1998, the four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs, i.e. the Bank of China, China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China) were instructed to lend to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The
Chinese state enterprises submitted investment plans and funding requests that had to be approved at the provincial and central authority level. Based on this, lending quotas were issued to enterprises. Since private enterprises were excluded from submitting investment plans, they were, naturally, also excluded from lending quotas. In addition, there was also a legal bias against private domestic firms, which made it harder for them to collateralize their assets in order to obtain loans, and made it riskier for banks to lend them money (Huang, 2003) .
The system was liberalized at the end of 1990s, when the China Constitution acknowledged the private sector to be an integral part of the economy, and theoretically it is not in place any more. However, in practice, banks still consider private enterprises to be riskier than their public peers either due to their short credit history or lower chance of being bailed out by the government. Moreover, as discussed in Park and Sehrt (2001) , lending by state banks is still determined by policy reasons, rather than by commercial motives.
In summary, a major problem in China's corporate sector is a political pecking order of firms which leads to the allocation of China's financial resources to the least efficient firms (state-owned enterprises), while denying the same resources to China's most efficient firms (private enterprises). Although they are the engine of growth in the Chinese economy 4 , private firms are discriminated against in terms of access to external funding, property rights protection, taxation, and market opportunities. Such distortions may force private Chinese firms to look for foreign investors (Huang, 2003) . By establishing cross-border relationships with foreign firms, private domestic firms can bypass both the financial and legal obstacles that they face at home. FDI can in fact be seen as a form of equity financing (Harrison et al., 2004) . Moreover, from the very beginning of economic reforms in China, foreign-invested firms were accorded a superior legal status compared with private firms.
The finance-growth nexus in China
A number of studies have looked at the links between indicators of financial development and growth in China obtaining contrasting results. Like ours, most of these studies are panel studies based on Chinese provinces. For instance, Liu and Li (2001) analyze the links between growth and the four sources of total investment in fixed assets (state budget appropriation, national bank loans, self-raised funds, and foreign investment). They find that between 1985 and 1998, the growth of national bank loans and self-raised funds are both positively related to the growth of provincial output, while state appropriation only affects growth in the interior regions, where non state sources of finance might be unavailable. Aziz and Duenwald (2002) use data for 27 provinces over the period 1988-97 and find no evidence that financial development (proxied by bank lending) boosts growth among Chinese provinces.
Specifically, domestic private credit plays a small role in the financing of the fast growing provinces. Using similar data over the period 1990 -1999 , Boyreau-Debray (2003 finds that credit extended by the banking sector has a negative impact on growth, which she attributes to the burden of supporting the state-owned corporate sector. Chen (2006) shows that Chinese growth has been fostered by the substitution of loans for state budget appropriation, but not by loan expansion. His findings are challenged by Cheng and Degryse (2006) who argue that banking development spurs growth in China 5 .
These studies make use of different financial indicators, and different econometric techniques, which might explain their contrasting results. Yet, none of them examines the channels through which financial development might affect growth. Our paper fills this gap, by looking at the links between finance, GDP growth, and two of its sources: physical capital accumulation and TFP growth. Our paper also contributes to the literature, making use of a very wide range of financial indicators measuring both financial development and distortions, and focusing for the first time, on whether the effects of these indicators on growth have declined over time, and on whether they differ across provinces characterized by different levels of FDI. Our objective is to understand whether there might be circumstances under which financial distortions do not hinder growth.
Data description and summary statistics
The key data used in this paper are our indicators of financial intermediary development and distortions, as well as measures of real per capita GDP growth and its components, i.e. per capita capital stock accumulation and per capita productivity growth. Our sample consists of a panel of 30 provinces in Mainland China with annual data for the period 1989-2003 6 . The
Appendix provides details on all variables used in our analysis and information on data sources.
Indicators of financial development and distortions
Our intention is to evaluate the impact of measures of both financial intermediaries' development and financial distortions on growth and its sources in the context of China.
Despite its large size, the Chinese banking sector is still dominated by four large state banks 5 Using a multivariate Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach, based on annual Chinese data over the period 1952 -2001 , Liang and Teng (2006 find that high levels of bank credit in China do not cause higher growth. 6 China is administratively decomposed into 31 provincial units, which fall into three categories: 22 provinces or sheng; 4 autonomous regions or zizhiqu (Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia and Guangxi); and 4 municipal cities or zhixiashi, under direct supervision of the central power (Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and, since 1997, Chongqing) . Tibet is excluded from our sample due to data constraints.
that allocate most of their financial resources to the inefficient and loss-making state-owned enterprise sector (Boyreau-Debray, 2003) . As such, the transition to a modern and profitoriented banking sector is far from being achieved.
A major challenge in this paper is therefore to disentangle between the effect of financial deepening and that of the distorting nature of the state-ruled banking sector. We go further than the indicators of financial development traditionally used in the literature, and rely on three families of indicators, intended to proxy for the development of the financial sector (Family 1), the misallocation of financial resources (Family 2), and the more modern and profit-oriented financial transactions (Family 3). The use of different measures focusing on different aspects of financial intermediation will allow us to account for both a size and a quality effect of the latter. To assess the robustness of our results, we will use several indicators within each family.
To evaluate the impact of the development of the financial sector, we will use three measures of financial depth (Family 1), one based on banks alone, and the other two on both bank and non-bank sources of private sector financing. More specifically, we will use the following three indicators:
(1) The ratio of total bank loans to GDP, which measures banking sector size (BANK
CREDIT)
7 .
(2) The ratio of total (bank and non-bank) loans to GDP, which measures the overall depth of the financial sector (TOTAL CREDIT).
(3) The ratio of household savings deposited in financial intermediaries relative to GDP (SAVINGS), which serves as a proxy of China's financial intermediary development 8 .
To evaluate the specific impact of misallocation of funds in the finance-growth nexus in China, we rely on the following three measures of the role of distortions induced by state interventionism in the financial sector (Family 2):
(4) The share of state-owned commercial banks in total bank credit (SOCB CREDIT share). Chinese statistics do not provide any information on credit allocation between 7 Unlike past studies and following Beck et al. (2000) , we carefully deflate those financial intermediary statistics, which are expressed as a ratio to GDP. Specifically, financial stock items are measured at the end of the period, while GDP is measured over the period. Simply dividing financial stock items by GDP can therefore produce misleading measures of financial development. This paper deflates end-of-year financial balance sheet items by end-of-year consumer price indices (CPI), and deflates the GDP series by the annual CPI. We then compute the average of the real financial balance sheet item in year t and t-1, and divide this average by real GDP measured in year t. (5) The ratio of state-owned commercial banks' credit to GDP (SOCB CREDIT to GDP).
(6) The ratio of loans to deposits of the SOCBs (CENTRAL). This ratio captures another distortion of the Chinese banking sector, namely the interventionism of the Central Bank. It was previously used by Lardy (1998), Dayal-Gulati and Hussain (2002) , and Boyreau-Debray (2003) . In China, while the volume of deposits is determined by economic activity, the volume of lending is largely determined by policy objectives and is set through a credit plan, independently of the ability of branch banks in each region to finance the lending target from local deposits (Lardy, 1998) . As pointed out
by Boyreau-Debray (2003) , some rapidly growing provinces could therefore have a low credit quota and be constrained in their lending relative to the rapid growth of their deposits. Alternatively, branch banks in slower growing regions could be assigned high quotas with insufficient local deposits to finance their lending: these provinces would therefore depend on the Central Bank to lend them additional funds.
We follow the literature and consider the ratio of SOCB loans to deposits as a measure of the Central Bank's credit to local branch banks aimed at helping them to meet their lending quotas.
Our third family of indicators intends to proxy for the efficient use of capital in a context of widespread misallocation. We rely on information of the decomposition of fixed asset investment financing by source. This is typically broken into domestic loans, state budgetary appropriation, foreign investment, and self-raised funds 9 . In general, loans are considered a more efficient means of resource distribution than state budget allocation. Unlike state budget appropriation, loans call in fact for payments of interest and principals, helping to harden enterprises' budget constraints, and promoting more efficient use of capital. Retained earnings may represent even harder budget constraints in a context of ineffectual decision-making and excessive investment. Both Liu and Li (2001) and Chen (2006) make use of these measures of fixed assets investment financing. The former find a significant relationship between growth and fixed asset investments financed by domestic loans and retained earnings, and the latter conclude that, while loan expansion did not directly contribute to growth, the substitution of loans for state budget appropriation did.
We construct the following two measures of market and profit-oriented financial transactions (Family 3):
(7) The share of fixed asset investment financed by domestic loans relative to that financed by state budgetary appropriation (LOANS over APPRO).
(8) The share of fixed asset investment financed by retained earnings (RETAINED
EARNINGS INVESTMENT).
Indicators of economic growth and its sources
Our investigation of the finance-growth nexus in China will assess the impact of our various indicators of financial development on real per capita GDP growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth.
The rate of real per capita GDP growth (GROWTH) is computed as yearly growth of per capita GDP deflated by consumer prices. The growth rate of the per capita physical capital stock (CAPITALGROWTH) is computed using the perpetual inventory method. We follow Harberger's (1978) suggestion for deriving an initial estimate of the capital stock, which assumes that each province was at its steady-state capital-output ratio in 1974 10 . We then apply the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate (δ) of five percent to compute capital stocks in later years. The capital stock (K t ) is therefore computed using the following formula:
where I t represents real investment in fixed assets.
As in Beck et al. (2000) , our measure of productivity growth (TFPGROWTH) builds on the neoclassical production function. We assume that this aggregate production function is channels such as bonds, stocks, venture capital, and retained earnings. As the latter is the prevalent component of self-raised funds, we will refer hereafter to self-raised funds as retained earnings. 10 As argued by Beck et al. (2000) , while this assumption is surely incorrect, it is better than assuming an initial capital stock of zero, which many researchers use. The initial stock is computed for the year 1974, the first year for which data on investment flows are available. Alternative measures of capital growth based on assuming an initial stock of zero produced similar results.
common across provinces and time, so that aggregate output in province i, Y i , is given by the following expression:
, where K denotes the capital stock; L, labor; and A, the level of total factor productivity. We solve for the growth rate of per capita productivity by first dividing all terms in the production function by L to get per capita production. We then take logarithms and the time derivative. Finally, we rely on the ratio of compensation of employees to GDP at factor cost in the People's Republic of China from the national accounts and on input-output tables to set the capital share. The overall economy-wide share of labor is about 0.6 (Young, 2003) . We therefore assume a capital share α=0.4 and solve for the growth rate of total factor productivity per capita, which leads to:
Descriptive statistics and correlations
The summary statistics of our variables are presented in Table 1a . Column (1) refers to the entire sample; columns (2) and (3) to the early (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) and late (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) periods, respectively; and columns (4) and (5), respectively to those province-year observations belonging to the three lower quartiles, and the highest quartile of the distribution of the FDI stock to GDP ratio.
Comparing the early with the late period, we can observe no major differences in the growth rates of GDP, TFP, and capital stock. Yet, the later period is characterized by a much higher GDP per capita, with no major differences in the FDI inflows to GDP ratio. It is also interesting to note that the share of population with more than primary education increased from about 73 percent in the early years to 86 percent in the later years, that the inflation rate declined from 9.28 percent to 0.52 percent, and that the share of state entities in total fixed assets declined from 65 percent to 52 percent.
Coming to our financial indicators, the statistics suggest that financial depth, which was already high at the start of the period, further increased from 1989 to 2003: the ratio of total bank loans to GDP rose from 78 percent to 91 percent, while the ratio of total loans to GDP rose from 95 percent to 109 percent. State interventionism, on the other hand, declined, probably as a result of the financial reforms discussed in the previous Section. In particular, the share of SOCB credit in total bank credit declined from 68 percent to 59 percent, while the ratio of loans to deposits of the SOCBs declined from 112 percent to 77 percent. Surprisingly, the share of fixed assets investment financed by loans relative to that financed by state budget appropriation also declined over time, as did the share financed by retained earnings.
Comparing the low and high-FDI province-year observations, we can see that the latter are characterized by higher GDP, TFP, and capital stock growth, by a higher level of GDP, degree of openness, percentage of educated people, and a lower share of state entities in total investment. The high-FDI regions also display a higher degree of financial depth, and a lower degree of state interventionism than their low-FDI counterparts. Finally, the share of fixed assets investment financed by loans relative to that financed by state budget appropriation is higher for high FDI recipients, while the share financed by retained earnings is slightly lower. Table 1b presents the correlation matrix between our growth variables and our financial indicators. We can see that our Family 1 and Family 2 indicators are negatively related with GDP and TFP growth, as well as with physical capital accumulation, while the correlation between our Family 3 indicators, growth, and its sources is generally positive. In the Section that follows, we will provide formal evidence for the effects of our financial indicators on GDP and TFP growth, and capital accumulation. We will also investigate whether the relationship between our financial indicators, growth, and its sources has changed over time, and whether it differs across provinces with different FDI stock to GDP ratios.
Baseline specification and estimation results
This section presents an empirical analysis of the impact of our financial indicators on provincial economic growth and its sources. We first present our baseline growth equation, and discuss the conditioning information set that we use as well as our econometric methodology. We then present and discuss the results.
Empirical framework
We use a cross-province time-series panel of data and employ dynamic panel techniques to estimate the relationship between finance and GDP growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth 11 . Our baseline regression, which we initially estimate using a withingroups estimator, takes the following form:
where i indexes provinces, and t, time. ∆Y is either GROWTH, CAPITALGROWTH, or TFPGROWTH. FINANCE represents in turn each of the eight indicators presented in Section 3.1 to proxy respectively for the size of the financial sector, its state-induced distorting nature, and its market driven functioning. CONTROL represents a vector of conditioning information that controls for other factors associated with economic growth, including lagged real per capita GDP 12 . Provincial fixed effects and time fixed effects are denoted by η i and λ t respectively and, ε i,t is an idiosyncratic error term.
Equation (2) confronts us with some econometric issues. First, particularly in the regression for real GDP per capita growth, introducing the lagged dependent variable among the regressors together with fixed individual effects renders the within-groups estimator biased and inconsistent even if ε i,t is not serially correlated, as the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term 13 . Second, in all specifications, most of the explanatory variables can be expected to be endogenously determined. We thus need to control for the endogeneity arising both from the dynamic specification of the equation and from reverse causation. In order to do so, we rely on the system Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) panel estimator, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 14 . The basic idea of the GMM system estimator is to rely on a system combining Equation (2) in levels and in first-differences. First-differencing allows us to control for the fixed effects. In order to control for the possible endogeneity of the regressors, we use once lagged firstdifferences of the regressors as instruments in the level equation, and twice or more lagged levels of the regressors as instruments in the first-differenced equation. The inclusion of the regression in levels in addition to that in first-differences helps to cope with weak-instrument biases 15 .
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the assumption that ε i,t does not exhibit serial correlation and on the validity of the instruments. We use two tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test for these assumptions: the J statistic and the test for second order serial correlation of the residuals (m2). The former is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters, under the null of instrument validity 16 . The m2 test is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no second-order serial correlation, and provides a further check on the specification of the model and on the legitimacy of variables dated t-2 as instruments. Failure to reject the null hypotheses of both tests gives support to our model.
Control variables (conditioning information set)
The vector of control variables, CONTROL, is defined according to the augmented Solow model as proposed by Mankiw et al. (1992) . The logarithm of lagged real per capita GDP is included to control for convergence. We also introduce the share of population with more than primary schooling as a proxy for human capital (EDUCATION). The following five additional policy variables that have been identified in the empirical growth literature as being correlated with growth performance across countries (Barro, 1991; Easterly et al., 1997) 
Regression results
Tables 2 and 3 report estimates of Equation (2) where ∆Y i,t is the real per capita GDP growth rate (GROWTH i,t ). In Table 2 , the within-groups estimator is used 17 , and in The variables in the conditioning information set also have the expected signs. Lagged GDP per capita attracts a negative and significant coefficient, indicating a process of convergence. Our proxy for human capital accumulation generally attracts a positive and significant coefficient. Finally, among our policy indicators, the share of state entities in total investment enters as a negative determinant of economic growth, while our proxies for the degree of openness (trade and FDI share of GDP) have a positive impact on economic growth.
In Table 3 , the Sargan-test of overidentifying restrictions indicates that the orthogonality conditions cannot be rejected at the five percent level, and the m2 test for the second order autocorrelation of the first-differenced residuals suggests that the error term is not serially correlated. Thus, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are appropriate. The strong link between finance and growth does not appear to be driven by simultaneity bias. Tables 4 and 5 present the within-groups and GMM estimates relative to physical   capital accumulation, and Tables 6 and 7 , those relative to TFP growth 18 . Both Tables 4 and 5 show that like in the case of real GDP growth, all our Family 1 and Family 2 indicators are negatively associated with physical capital accumulation. Thus, contrary to Beck et al. (2000) , financial intermediary development indicators do have a significant impact on capital accumulation. This can be seen as evidence that the inefficient allocation of saving hampers capital accumulation, probably because the private firms, which have more potential to invest, are unable to obtain funds. Coming to our Family 3 indicators, we can see that the share of total investment in fixed assets financed by retained earnings has a significant effect on capital accumulation, although this effect only appears when GMM is used in estimation.
We obtain similar results for productivity growth (Tables 6 and 7 
5.
Evolution over time and FDI contingency of the finance-growth relationship
Evolution over time
As we discussed in Section 2.1, since the beginning of the economic reform, China has experienced a fundamental change with regard to the means of allocating financial resources.
banking sector came about with China's entry in the WTO in 2001. Consequently, as shown in Table 1a , state interventionism has significantly declined in the latest years of our sample.
However, although these changes in banking policy are important, serious banking sector problems remain. It is therefore of primary interest to investigate whether the relationship between finance and economic growth has evolved over the period of reform. We would expect that the rationalization and introduction of market driven practices in the final years of our sample would mitigate the problem of misallocation of funds, and therefore reduce the estimated negative impact of our indicators of financial development and state interference on growth. We also anticipate that reforms will reduce the differences between the various sources of financing in terms of returns to investment. In a context of widespread efficiency, there is in fact no reason to expect higher effects on growth of investment financed by loans, state appropriation, or retained earnings. Returns to investment financed with different sources should converge and equalize in parallel with financial system reforms, so that our indicators of market driven finance would lose their relevance over time. In order to test these hypotheses, we estimate the following variant of Equation (2) The estimates of Equation (3) for GDP growth, capital accumulation, and TFP growth are presented respectively in Tables 8, 9 , and 10. To save space, we only present the GMM estimates: all results were, however, robust to using the within-groups estimator. Tables 8 and   10 show that the coefficients associated with This can be explained by the fact that a more efficient financial system led to a rationalization of investment behavior, and not to an increase in capital accumulation. Rawski (2006) documents China's traditional reliance on "extensive" growth achieved by adding more resources to the production process, rather than "intensive" growth based on higher productivity. Officially managed investments typically generate low returns, and the overall investment picture in China reveals a surprising persistence of Soviet-style outcomes.
Vigorous reform efforts are expected to increase investment returns and address the problems of ineffectual decision-making (Von Pfeil, 2004) . As such, financial system reforms should help mitigating the Soviet-style seasonality pattern in investment spending and reduce excessive investment. 20 Havrylchyk and Poncet (2006) provide primary empirical confirmation of this thesis. They find that indicators of the distorting nature of the inefficient banking sector are significant determinants of the FDI received by Chinese provinces. It should be noted, however, that while this thesis might explain part of the inward FDI in China, it cannot explain the very rapid increase that took place more recently, when discrimination against private firms was becoming less relevant. See Prasad and Wei (2005) for a discussion of other possible factors explaining the behavior of FDI in China in recent years. 21 Prior to 1999, private firms were also banned from exporting directly, while foreign-invested firms were granted automatic trading licenses within their lines of business. Establishing joint-ventures with foreign firms made it therefore easier for private firms to enter export markets. 22 We use the stock of FDI to GDP ratio as an interaction term, instead of the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP, since the former indicator is likely to better capture the overall presence of foreign firms in each province. Our results were generally robust to using the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP as an interaction term. indicators, and a positive β 1 coefficient for Family 3 indicators) would suggest that the higher the FDI in each region, the lower the constraints related to the misallocation of finance, and the less the heterogeneity in terms of returns to investment depending on financing sources.
The estimates of Equation (4) for GDP growth, capital accumulation, and TFP growth are presented in Tables 11, 12 , and 13, respectively. The results suggest that provinces characterized by higher FDI stocks relative to GDP tend to suffer less from the negative effects of Family 2 indicators on GDP, capital, and TFP growth. For instance, the results in For a province with an FDI stock to GDP ratio twice as large, the same increase in SOCB CREDIT would result in a 0.45 percentage points slower GDP growth rate. These findings support the view that FDI may be used as a way to bypass the inefficiencies of the local banking sector. In particular, private firms, for whom it is difficult to obtain loans from state banks, may use foreign joint-ventures to acquire needed capital, and can in this way achieve higher productivity and growth rates (Harrison et al., 2004; Huang, 2003) 23 .
Similar results are observed for the effects of our Family 1 indicators on TFP growth, but not for GDP and capital growth 24 . Coming to our Family 3 indicators, we find that the 23 Inspection of data from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey (2003), which includes 2400 firms surveyed in 13 cities in 2003, suggests that 12 percent of private firms (i.e. of those firms with a private share greater than 49 percent) have shares owned by a foreign partner. Moreover, the sales per employee of these firms are 15 times higher, and their growth over the period 2001-2002 was almost 5 times faster than those of the 100 percent domestically owned private firms. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that those private firms that enter joint-ventures with foreign firms are able to bypass the costs associated with an inefficient banking sector in China, and can consequently achieve higher productivity and growth rates. 24 In Table 12 , which reports the estimates for capital accumulation, we can see that while the Family 1 indicators do not attract statistically significant coefficients, their interactions with the FDI stock to GDP ratio attract negative and precisely determined coefficients. This finding can be explained by the fact that FDIfinanced projects may be driven more by a logic of efficiency than by a logic of spending. Consequently, FDI abundant environments may promote less disbursement-driven investment, reducing the rhythm of capital accumulation.
positive effects of loans over state budget appropriation on GDP and TFP growth are lower in high FDI recipient provinces.
In sum, our results indicate that provinces with higher FDI stocks relative to GDP benefit from faster economic growth primarily thanks to enhanced efficiency, and seem to be less sensitive to the negative impact of state intervention induced inefficiency and constraints in capital access. FDI can therefore help to alleviate the costs associated with financial distortions, and could provide an explanation for why, as discussed by Allen at al. (2005) ,
China is a counterexample to the findings of the finance-growth literature, being characterized by malfunctioning financial institutions and phenomenal growth rates 25 .
Conclusions
We have used data for 30 Chinese provinces over the period 1989-2003 to study the relationship between finance and economic growth. Moving beyond existing literature, we have considered a wide range of financial indicators, accounting both for the size and the quality of financial intermediation; focused on two important sources of GDP growth:
physical capital accumulation, and total factor productivity growth; and investigated whether the relationship between our financial indicators and growth has changed over time, and whether it differs across provinces characterized by different FDI stock to GDP ratios.
We found that traditionally used indicators of financial development and Chinaspecific indicators measuring the level of state interventionism in finance are generally negatively associated with growth and its sources, while indicators measuring the degree of market driven financing in the economy tend to promote GDP and TFP growth, as well as capital accumulation. This suggests that financial distortions do represent an impediment to growth.
In order to explain how, in spite of the distortions, China managed to sustain phenomenal growth rates, we showed that the adverse effects of financial distortions on growth have gradually declined over time, probably due to the progressive restructuring of the banking sector in China. We also showed that these effects tend to be weaker for high FDI recipients, suggesting that FDI may be used to alleviate the costs associated with the 25 Alfaro et al (2004) , Durham (2004) , and Hermes and Lensink (2003) use cross-country data to look at the other side of the coin: they examine the extent to which the effects of FDI on growth depend on the countries' level of financial development. They find that it is only countries with well-developed financial markets that gain significantly from FDI. They argue that the lack of development of local financial markets can limit the economy's ability to take advantage of potential FDI spillovers. In contrast, we show that, in the Chinese context, it is financial distortions at home that may lead domestic firms to establish joint-ventures with foreign firms.
inefficient banking sector: private firms, which are generally discriminated against by the local financial system, might be able to use foreign joint-ventures as sources of finance, and might consequently achieve higher productivity and growth rates. FDI could therefore provide an explanation for why, as discussed by Allen at al. (2005) , China is a counterexample to the findings of the finance-growth literature, being characterized by malfunctioning financial institutions and phenomenal growth rates. It is obviously also possible that growth has been so high in China despite the poorly performing banking sector, because private firms were able to make use of alternative mechanisms such as internal finance, non-bank financial intermediaries, and coalitions of various forms among firms;
investors, and local governments. Using firm-level data to understand how exactly the fastgrowing private Chinese firms finance themselves would be a way of shedding more light on this issue and is on the agenda for future research. Yet, whichever the explanation, we can conclude that there are indeed circumstances under which financial distortions do not represent an impediment to growth in China after all.
Appendix: Definition of the variables and statistical sources
Most data on the banking and financial sector for Chinese provinces are taken from the annual SOCB CREDIT to GDP: ratio of state-owned commercial banks' credit to GDP (source:
CENTRAL: ratio of loans to deposits of the state-owned banks (source: ACFB). Other FDI stock/GDP: ratio of foreign direct investment stock to GDP (source: CSY and authors' computation). The FDI stock is computed as the sum of the deflated FDI inflows.
List of provinces and municipalities
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Nei Monggol, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing. 
